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CHILDPROOFING THE INTERNET

Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr.*
For many years, the United States Supreme Court has taken the view that
the government may not "reduce the adult population... to reading only what
is fit for children."' At the same time, however, the Supreme Court's approach
to children and erotica has been janus-faced: even as it has proclaimed the
freedom of adults to peruse indecent (but not obscene) materials, it also has
abetted and encouraged government efforts to protect children from harms
thought to be associated with pornography. Thus, the government may punish
a convenience store owner for selling a non-obscene magazine to a minor,
provided that the magazine is "obscene" as to minors.2 Similarly, the Federal
Communications Commission may severely restrict the broadcast of "indecent"
materials over radio and television frequencies in order to protect children from
exposure to age-inappropriate subject matter. The constitutional right of
privacy protects the right of an adult to possess even obscene materials in the
home,4 but this sphere of personal autonomy does not extend to child
pornography. 5
In case after case, the Justices have struggled to accomplish two similar, but
distinct, goals related to child protection. First, the Supreme Court has
endorsed the idea that adult erotica has a presumptively harmful effect on

* Ethan Allen Faculty Fellow and Professor of Law, Washington & Lee University School
of Law.
1 Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380, 383 (1957).
2 Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 636-39 (1968) (upholding a New York law that
prohibited the sale of erotica to minors age seventeen or younger and endorsing a modified
definition of obscenity for use in determining the constitutionally permissible scope of such
statutes).
3 Fed. Communications Comm'n v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748-51 (1978)
(upholding agency ban on use of indecent language during periods of the day when a significant
child audience might exist).
4 See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 565-66 (1969) (holding that the Constitution
creates a right of privacy that encompasses possession and use of obscene materials in a
person's home).
5 See Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 108-11 (1990) ("Given the importance of the state's
interest in protecting the victims of child pornography, we cannot fault Ohio for attempting to
stamp out this vice at all levels in the distribution chain.").
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children and has allowed restrictions on access to such materials in order to
protect children from exposure. Accordingly, the federal and state governments
have a constitutionally legitimate interest in suppressing, at least as to minors,
sexually explicit materials that adults may lawfully possess and peruse. The
Supreme Court has held that this interest justifies prohibitions on the sale of
indecent, but not obscene, materials to minors, 6 restrictions on the content of
mass media broadcasts generally available over the airwaves, 7 encouraging
cable system operators to censor materials on leased access cable channels, 8 and
restrictions on ribald student speech in the public schools. 9
Second, the Justices have shown a pronounced concern with the
exploitation of children in the production of erotica for the adult audience (i.e.,
so-called "kiddie porn"). As a general proposition, the federal and state
governments are free to criminalize the manufacture, sale, and possession of
child pornography, without regard to its source or content.' The rationale for
this rule reflects a common sense judgment that minors cannot give meaningful
consent to participate in the production of such materials, that the production of
such materials is inherently exploitative and harmful to the children in the
materials, and that a market for such materials will undoubtedly ensure the
continued production of child pornography to meet the market demand."
In an ideal world, government would protect children from the harms
associated with the production and distribution of pornography without
seriously eroding the free speech rights of adults. Accordingly, the Supreme

6

See Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 637-39.

7 See Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. at 748-5 1.
8

See Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium v. Fed. Communications Comm'n, 518

U.S. 727, 737-53 (1996).
9 See Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683-85 (1986) ("Surely it is a highly
appropriate function of public education to prohibit the use of vulgar and offensive terms in
public discourse.").
1o See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 756-64 (1982); see also Osborne, 495 U.S. at
108-11.
" See Ferber, 458 U.S. at 756-62; see also Osborne, 495 U.S. at 111 ("[Als Ferber
recognized, the materials produced by child pornographers permanently record the victim's
abuse" and "[s]econd, encouraging the destruction of these materials is also desirable because
evidence suggests that pedophiles use child pornography to seduce other children into sexual
activity."). Cf Katherine Franke, Constructing Heterosexuality: Putting Sex to Work, 75
DENVER U. L. REV. 1139, 1143-53 (1998) (describing same-sex manhood rituals practiced by
the Sambia people of Papua New Guinea and questioning whether, in cultural context, the
practices are in fact sexualized, asking "[w]hy should we assume that the central meaning of
Sambia initiation practices is sexual, that is, erotic?").
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Court consistently has rejected the notion that the government may regulate
speech generically in order to protect the most vulnerable persons in the
community.1 2 But this commitment has not always carried the day. After all,
Federal Communications Commission v. Pacifica Foundation, which found
over-the-air radio and television broadcasts to be "uniquely pervasive" and
"uniquely accessible to children,"' 3 upheld content-based restrictions
prohibiting "indecent" broadcasts, regardless of the literary, artistic, political, or
scientific value of the material considered as a whole.' 4 George Carlin's
famous "seven dirty words" monologue skewers the federal government's
efforts to excise certain words from the airwaves (and public discourse more
generally),' 5 but the Federal Communications Commission's indecency
regulations remain on the books and the agency routinely enforces, or threatens
enforcement of, these rules. 16
The pattern that has emerged is one of a jurisprudence fundamentally in
conflict with itself. On the one hand, government may not reduce adults to
materials appropriate for children. On the other, however, it may enact
regulations burdening the production and distribution of materials believed to
be harmful to minors. Government cannot restrict the distribution of adultcontent materials without, at the same time, impeding adult access in the
process. This cause-effect relationship has given rise to a fundamental
contradiction in the Supreme Court's efforts to address the problem of children
and pornography. 17 Moreover, the advent of the Internet has made these issues

12

See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476,489 (1957) ("The Hicklin test, judging obscenity

by the effect of isolated passages upon the most susceptible persons, might well encompass
material legitimately treating sex, and so it must be rejected as unconstitutionally restrictive of
the freedoms of speech and press."). But cf. Regina v. Hicklin, [1868] L.R. 3 Q.B. 360
(sustaining government regulation aimed at protecting most vulnerable elements of society from
harm associated with pornography).
"3438 U.S. 726, 748-49(1978).
14

Id. at 746-5 1.

15 See id. at 751-55 (providing transcript of the monologue); see also id.at 777 (Brennan,
J.,

dissenting) (noting the irony of the FCC's ban on Carlin's speech from radio broadcast).
16 See, e.g., In re Enforcement of Prohibitions Against Broadcast
Indecency in 18 U.S.C. §
1464, Report and Order, 8 FCC Rcd. 704 (1993); see also Clay Calvert & Robert D. Richards,
Free Speech and the Right to Offend: Old Wars, New Battles, Different Media, 18 GA. ST. U.
L. REV. 671, 697-703 (2002); Edyth Wise, A Historical Perspective on the Protection of
Childrenfrom BroadcastIndecency, 3 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 15 (1996).
17 See generally Amy Adler, Inverting the FirstAmendment, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 921,92537,961-69 (2001) (arguing that "child pornography law has undergone a dramatic growth spurt,
unchecked by critical analysis," noting that "many contemporary artworks have no protection
under the First Amendment," and suggesting that "to understand the true costs of the decision
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more pressing and their resolution in an intellectually persuasive fashion more
difficult.
I. ADULT CONTENT ON THE INTERNET: RENO V. ACLU
AND ASHCROFT V. ACLU

Limiting children's access to indecent materials on the Internet presents a
very difficult problem. This is so because adults derive significant free speech
benefits from an open, diverse marketplace of ideas and information on the
Internet. Attempting to excise all age-inappropriate materials from the Internet
would impose astonishingly high costs on adults seeking access to protected
speech. At the same time, however, legislators at all levels of government have
registered concern with the ability of minors to obtain access to ageinappropriate materials over the Internet. Moreover, the Supreme Court
limit the access of minors to
previously has held that legislation designed to
18
erotic materials is constitutionally permissible.
In the case of a bookstore or magazine rack, however, it is relatively easy
for a shopkeeper to monitor precisely who is browsing or attempting to
purchase the goods. Monitoring costs are really no higher than for other agerestricted goods, such as alcohol or cigarettes.
Monitoring costs on the Internet are quite another matter. On the Internet,
no virtual shopkeeper exists to keep an eye on exactly who is looking at what.
Internet service providers ("ISPs") probably represent the most logical virtual
shopkeeper. These companies facilitate access to myriad websites on behalf of
their subscribers and could, at least in theory, monitor (and even control) the
sites and materials that their subscribers visit. Oddly enough, however,
Congress has expressly exempted ISPs from liability for facilitating the transfer
of age-inappropriate materials to minors.'

9

Rather than force ISPs to assume

not to exempt works of value, we must assess this stance in light of the evolving definition of
'child pornography' and the growing artistic interest in depicting children's bodies"); Amy
Adler, The Perverse Law of Child Pornography, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 209, 234-44 (2001)
(discussing judicial recognition of child pornography as a discrete class of speech and the
expansion of the classification beyond materials that involve harm to real children and observing
that "[t]here is a sense of boundlessness in child pornography law").

18See Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 636-39 (1968); Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S.
380, 383-84 (1957).
'9 See 47 U.S.C. §§ 230(c), 23 1(b) (2001); see also Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky, Silencing John

Doe: Defamation& Discoursein Cyberspace,49 DuKE L.J. 855, 868-72 (2000) (describing the
broad exemption from liability for Internet content Congress extended to ISPs, and arguing that
"[b]oth the title of the Act and its legislative history suggest that Congress meant to establish a
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the role of a virtual shopkeeper or face civil and criminal liabilities for failing to
do so, Congress has elected to reward ISPs making no efforts (or half-hearted
efforts) at protecting children.
This encourages ISPs to leave the Internet a free-for-all, but intellectually it
is the equivalent of excusing a shopkeeper for leaving a rack of Playboy and
Penthousemagazines unguarded and unwatched outside his store. If Congress
were really concerned about children's access to age-inappropriate materials
over the Web, its members would pay less attention to America Online's
lobbyists and devote greater legislative effort to making ISPs assist in
protecting children who use the Internet. As things stand now, if an ISP does
not monitor content, it is excused from all liability for the content it facilitates
(just like a telephone company has no liability for facilitating a threatening
telephone call or a call used to plan a robbery). An ISP may monitor content,
but it faces no legal consequences if its efforts fall short. Just as New York
could impose a higher burden on a business selling adult-themed magazines,
Congress could (and perhaps should) demand more of companies like
AOL/Time Warner.2 °
All that said, keeping children from accessing age-inappropriate materials
over the Internet represents an almost impossible task, with or without the
active assistance of the ISPs. 21 The Internet exacerbates tremendously the
problem of protecting children from age-inappropriate content by lowering to
almost zero the transaction costs associated with obtaining hard core erotica.
With a few swift keystrokes, an enterprising twelve year old can obtain pictures
that would make Playboy or Penthouse look prudish. Thus, the Internet
fundamentally differs from a bookstore or a public library: a store clerk or
librarian can easily check a patron's identification prior to providing adult
materials, thereby denying minors access to age-inappropriate materials; by way
of contrast, the ability to install filtering devices that reliably limit access by
children-but not adults-to particular websites simply does not exist. 22 If
policy that ISPs would not be subject to liability as 'publishers' of content posted by third

parties just because they exercise a limited degree of editorial control over content.").
20 See John F. McGuire, Note, When Speech Is HeardAround the World: Internet Content
Regulation in the United States and Germany, 74 N.Y.U. L. REv. 750, 770-71 (1999)
(describing the German "Information and Communication Services Law," a statute that imposes
criminal liability on ISPs for failing to police proscribed content that is accessible over the
Internet to persons resident in Germany).
21 See generally Melanie Hersh, Note, Is COPPA a Cop Out?: The Child Online Privacy
Protection Act as Proof That Parents, Not Government, Should Be Protecting Children's
Interests on the Internet, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1831 (2001).
22 See generally Jack M. Balkin, Media Filters, the V-Chip, and the Foundations of
BroadcastRegulation, 45 DuKE L.J. 1131, 1141-53 (1996) (discussing the role and function of
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erotic materials are available on the Web, there will always be some risk that
children will gain access to them. As things stand, then, government has
essentially two choices: ban content on the Internet or run a substantial risk that
children will gain access to age-inappropriate materials.
Enter Congress. Concerned with the ubiquity of porn on the Internet,
Congress has attempted legislatively to restrict children's access to adult
materials. The Communications Decency Act of 199623 required content
providers to determine affirmatively the age of a person seeking access to a
website featuring "patently offensive" content 24 and also prohibited knowingly
25
sending an "indecent" message to a minor. The statute permitted affirmative
defenses based on the use of an age verification protocol (such as requiring an
adult verification account number or a credit card as a precondition to access)
or the use of "good faith, reasonable, effective, and appropriate actions. 26
In Reno v. ACLU,27 the Supreme Court struck down as overbroad material
provisions on the Communications Decency Act, including the definition of
proscribed material, 28 the ban on transmissions of indecent messages to
minors, 29 and the requirement of affirmative age verification efforts (at least as
applied to non-commercial websites). 30 Although the decision invalidated key
provisions of the CDA, Reno plainly left open the possibility that more
narrowly tailored restrictions might withstand constitutional scrutiny.
The Reno decision effectively broke with Pacifica's reasoning by
disallowing government regulations that protect children from ageinappropriate content, notwithstanding the increasingly pervasive nature of the
Internet and its websites. 32 This may or may not be a good thing, but either way
filtering devices for accessing and limiting access to information and arguing that "[i]f filters
cannot be made relatively costless for parents to use, they will be ineffective in practice even if
available in theory").
23 110 Stat. 133 (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 223 (2001)).
24 47 U.S.C. § 223(d)(1) (2001).
25 Id. at § 223(a)(1)(B).
26 Id. at § 223(e)(5)(A).
27 521 U.S. 844 (2001).
29

See id. at 874-78.
See id. at 882-83.

30

See 47 U.S.C. § 223.

28

31 See Reno, 521 U.S. at 874, 877-79.
32 See id. at 866-67, 869-70. Significantly, the majority failed to offer a persuasive

explanation for its decision not to extend PacificaFoundationto the Internet. Justice Stevens,
the author of both Pacifica Foundationand Reno, made a weak effort to distinguish Pacifica
Foundation. He argued that the Federal Communication Commission's ban was limited to
specific times (presently covering 18 of 24 hours a day, running from 6:00 AM to 12:00 AM).
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the Supreme Court's efforts to balance adult access with reasonable child
protection measures will face continuing difficulties. In the end, maintaining
relatively open adult access to adult-themed materials over the Web while
effectively limiting children's access are fundamentally incompatible policy
objectives - advancing one goal inevitably comes at the price of impeding the
achievement of the other. Reno resolved these issues in favor of adult access,
but did not purport to set the final balance.
The Child Online Protection Act ("COPA") 33 represented Congress's
follow up effort to the Communications Decency Act. COPA applies to a much
more limited number of websites. The websites must be "commercial" in
nature; the sender must "knowingly" make available the age-inappropriate
materials to a minor; and COPA incorporates the Miller standard for obscenity,
modified by the Ginsberg "as to minors" addendum. 34 Adopting age
verification requirements for access to a website featuring adult content, such as
an adult check service or a credit card requirement, will satisfy COPA's

See Reno, 521 U.S. at 866-67. An eighteen hour ban, covering the times when most viewers
and listeners access radio and television services, effectively chills such speech. Because of the
advertiser-funded nature of free, over-the-air radio and television, a ban on indecent materials
when significant audiences exist is effectively a ban on such materials altogether. Without the
prospect of significant advertising revenues-which require mass audiences, or at least the
potential for mass audiences-station programmers will not be willing to pay much for a given
program. Accordingly, program producers will be unwilling to produce high quality indecent
programming, at least for broadcast on free, over-the-air radio and television. See Ronald J.
Krotoszynski, Jr., The Inevitable Wasteland: Why the Public Trustee Model of Broadcast
Television Regulation Must Fail, 95 MICH. L. REV. 2101, 2109-15 (1997) (discussing the
advertiser-driven economics of commercial television broadcasting and the persistent need of
commercial broadcasters to generate mass audiences on a regular basis in order to remain
profitable). Justice Stevens noted that Pacifica Foundation involved only administrative
sanctions, rather than criminal sanctions. He must not have known that indecency fines, or
"forfeitures," in FCC-speak, have run into the millions of dollars. A multi-million dollar fine
represents a deterrent of equal force to a criminal sanction. His final rationale involved the
limited application of free speech principles to broadcasters. See Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC,
395 U.S. 367 (1969). This is true, but hardly provides a persuasive rationale for invalidating the
provisions of the Communications Decency Act at issue in Reno. Bookstores historically have
enjoyed full First Amendment protection, but have nevertheless been required to refrain from
selling indecent books to minors. The question is not whether the government can ban the
distribution of indecency over the Internet--the CDA did not purport to do this-but rather
whether the government could prohibit the transmission of indecent materials to children.
"3 47 U.S.C. § 231. This statute prohibits any person from "knowingly and with knowledge
of the character of the material, in interstate or foreign commerce, or by means of the World
Wide Web, mak[ing] any communication for commercial purposes that is available to any minor
and that includes any material that is harmful to minors." Id. at § 231(a)(1).
3
Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 636-39 (1968).
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requirements.35 In tandem, these limitations substantially restrict the censorial
effect of COPA.
Although serious questions remain regarding the constitutionality of this
statute, in Ashcroft v. ACLU,36 a splintered court rejected a facial challenge to
COPA based on the statute's reliance on local community standards,37 rather
than a single national standard, to define "material harmful to minors. 3 8
Significantly, Ashcroft does not address the ultimate question of whether COPA
is constitutional. The Justices spoke only to the narrow question of whether
Congress deployed a constitutionally acceptable definition of proscribable
information.3 9 No opinion garnered a strong majority on this precise point,4 °
and the Reno holding suggests that if COPA's ultimate effect is to reduce
significantly the universe of material available to adults over the Internet,
COPA would be unconstitutionally overbroad, just like the CDA before it.4 1 Of
course, even if the Supreme Court ultimately sustains COPA, the statute's
blanket exemption for non-commercial websites (as Reno effectively mandates)
ensures that the problem of child access will continue.
Good arguments exist for preferring adult access to child protection in the
context of the Internet. At least arguably, it is far easier for parents to install
blocking software and net monitoring software than it is for adults to find
materials through sources other than the Internet. If one lives in rural West
Virginia, access to the photographs of Robert Maplethorpe or the writings of
the Marquis de Sade might be, at best, rather limited in the absence of the

" See 47 U.S.C. § 23 1(a).
36 122 S. Ct. 1700 (2002).
See 47 U.S.C. § 231(e)(6).
38 Ashcroft, 122 S.Ct. 1712-13.
39 The precise question before the Supreme Court involved the use of local "community
standards" rather than a single national standard for evaluating the prurience and patent
offensiveness of materials that a minor views on the Web. See Ashcroft, 122 S.Ct. at 1712-13
("The scope of our decision today is quite limited. We hold only that COPA's reliance on
community standards to identify 'material that is harmful to minors' does not by itself render the
statute substantially overbroad for purposes of the First Amendment.").
40 See id. at 1714-15 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); id.
at 1715-16 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and concurring in thejudgment); id. at 1717, 1719-20,
1722 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
41 See id. at 1713 ("We do not express any views on whether COPA suffers from substantial
overbreadth for other reasons.... [w]hile respondents urge us to resolve these questions at this
time, prudence dictates allowing the Court of Appeals to first examine these difficult issues.");
see also id. at 1722 (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("There may be grave doubt that COPA is
consistent with the First Amendment; but we should not make that determination with so many
questions unanswered.").
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Internet. The Internet makes such materials available with the stroke of a few
keys. In this way, the Internet radically expands the universe of information
and has an intrinsically democratizing function.4 2 Rich or poor, urban or rural,
all citizens now enjoy roughly the same access to the marketplace of ideas.4 3
At the same time, highly qualified efforts at limiting children's access to
adult websites-like COPA-are unlikely to be effective. Even if government
requires the use of a driver's license or credit card as a pass key to websites
featuring adult content (as COPA presently requires for commercial websites
featuring adult content), a sufficiently enterprising naughty child would not be
precluded from obtaining access (particularly if the verification simply required
entry of data online). At the same time, any system of in-person checks would
be wholly implausible in cyberspace. People share content over the Internet
without regard to real space or geography. It is very unlikely that a particular
content provider will have a real world local presence in Lexington, Virginia, or
Moss Point, Mississippi. Moreover, websites that do not generate fees would
not be able to absorb the cost of maintaining a comprehensive system of inperson age verification.
Favoring the protection of children over preserving access to unrestricted
content would effectively destroy this aspect of the Internet. 44 Materials that
would be available in the absence of effective age verification schemes will not
be available if such schemes are enacted and enforced against all websites
(whether commercial or non-commercial in character). Such schemes also
would undoubtedly increase the cost of accessing information even as they
decrease the universe of available content (as non-commercial websites shut
down rather than comply with the age verification requirements or face liability
for failing to block access by minors). Perhaps the transaction costs could be
reduced if the government itself undertook the age verification process, but
even this solution might prove unpalatable to the operators of non-commercial

42

See Cass R. Sunstein, The FirstAmendment in Cyberspace, 104 YALE L.J. 1757, 1781-84

(1995); Eugene Volokh, Cheap Speech and What it Will Do, 104 YALE L.J. 1805, 1833-43
(1995).
43 See Lidsky, supra note 19, at 892-902 (discussing benefits of instant information
on the
Internet to the process of democratic deliberation and noting that "[sicholars have touted the
Internet as the living embodiment of the 'marketplace of ideas' metaphor that lies at the heart of
the First Amendment" and that "[f]rom a First Amendment scholar's perspective, the fascination
of the Internet lies in its potential for realizing the concept of public discourse at the heart of the
Supreme Court's First Amendment jurisprudence").
44 Cf. Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380, 383 (1957) ("Surely, this is to burn the house to
roast the pig.").
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websites. In fact, mandatory government registration schemes would
themselves implicate important
First Amendment values and might not survive
45
scrutiny.
constitutional
In sum, childproofing the Internet in a fashion that does not "reduce the
adult population . . . to reading only what is fit for children" currently
represents an impossible task.46 Either the Internet remains essentially free,
with the concomitant risk of some children accessing age-inappropriate
materials, or the Internet can be child proofed through aggressive government
regulations that protect children but, in the process, deprive adults of important
information. For the time being, Reno settles this question in favor of adult
access, even at the price of potential harm to children. Whether the Supreme
Court will continue to set the balance in this fashion remains to be seen, but
Ashcroft does not send an unequivocal message that the Supreme Court will
accept a radically altered balance of these interests in order to afford children a
greater measure of protection.
11.

PROTECTING CHILDREN FROM SEXUAL EXPLOITATION:
FREE SPEECH COALITION V. ASHCROFT

The second theme in the Supreme Court's jurisprudence addressing
children and free speech involves materials that feature children as objects of
sexual desire or expression. Beginning with New York v. Ferber,47 the
Supreme Court has declined to give erotica featuring real children any First
Amendment protection. The Court's reasons are both simple and compelling:
1) The prevention of sexual exploitation and abuse of children constitutes a
government objective of surpassing importance;

45 Giving the government a list of all persons who visit your Web site is unlikely to be

popular either with persons who create and maintain websites or those who visit them. In the
context of forced disclosure of campaign contributions, the Supreme Court has held that
mandatory disclosure requirements cannot be applied where the effect would invite social
retaliation against contributors. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 64-74 (1976); see also
Brown v. Socialist Workers '74 Campaign Comm., 459 U.S. 87, 91-98 (1982); NAACP v.
Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460-63 (1957). At least arguably, a government-sponsored age
verification program would require mandatory disclosure of a sort that cases like Buckley,
Brown, and NAACP disallow.
46 Butler, 352 U.S. at 383.
4' 458 U.S. 747 (1982).
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2) [T]he distribution network for child pornography must be closed if the
production of material which requires the sexual exploitation of children is to
be effectively controlled;
3) The advertising and sale of child pornography provide an economic motive
for and are thus an integral part of the production of such materials;
4) The value of permitting live performances and photographic reproductions
of children engaged in lewd sexual conduct is exceedingly modest, if not de
minimis; and
5) Recognizing and classifying child pornography as a category of material
outside the protection of the First Amendment is not incompatible with our
earlier decisions.48
A reasonable person cannot really argue with these five propositions. A
problem, however, inheres-in their application.
If courts interpret the category of child pornography broadly, a great deal of
49
art and literature becomes potentially proscribable as "kiddie porn.
Donatello' s bronze statue of King David flagrantly sexualizes the body of an
adolescent boy. Nabokov's Lolita presents an equivocal view about the moral
status of a sexual relationship between an adult man and a teenage girl.
William Shakespeare's Romeo andJuliet involves an illicit love affair between
two teenagers well below the age of 18.50 The Ferber holding potentially
criminalizes any live representation of these works involving the use of minors.
Moreover, the Ferber market rationale would conceivably sweep up erotic
materials that generate a demand for works that feature live children, even if the
particular materials at issue do not themselves use real children in their
production.
Reading Ferber broadly, Congress enacted the Child Pornography
Prevention Act ("CPPA"), legislation that criminalized not only the distribution
of materials featuring live children, but also any materials that appeared to

48 Id. at 757, 759,

761-63.

See Adler, Inverting the FirstAmendment, supra note 17, at 928-35, 937-54, 961-69;
Adler, The PerverseLaw, supra note 17, at 234-44.
50 Shakespeare identifies Juliet as a youth of around thirteen years of age. See WILLIAM
49

SHAKESPEARE, THE TRAGEDY OF ROMEO AND JULIET,

change of fourteen years.").

act I, sc. 2,1. 9 ("She hath not seen the
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feature live children, whether created through computer generation or the use of
youthful looking adults.51 If any market for child pornography has bad
tendencies,52 then the use of real children in the production of a particular
picture, movie, or book should not really matter; harm will eventually come to
real children because pedophiles will not be satisfied with "virtual" or faux
child pornography.
Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition,5 3 presented a First Amendment
challenge to the CPPA and therefore required the Supreme Court to delimit the
precise scope of the Ferber holding. The majority, led by Justice Kennedy,
concluded that Congress could not proscribe materials whose production does
not directly harm children. Thus, the CPPA failed constitutional review
because it banned otherwise protected speech. The Ferberrule categorically
excluding child pornography from any First Amendment protection simply has
no application when the materials at issue do not feature actual children.54
Three Justices, led by Justice O'Connor, dissented in part, relying on a
broader reading of Ferber to sustain the government's ban on virtual child
pornography.55 If any market for child pornography leads to the sexual
exploitation of children, Congress could reasonably conclude that the entire
market should be closed.56 Materials featuring virtual child pornography might
not directly cause harm to children in their production, but the secondary effects

51 See Child Pornography Prevention Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2252, 2256(8) (2000).
52 See Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 509-11 (1951) (noting that the clear and
present danger test "cannot mean that before the government may act, it must wait until the
putsch is about to be executed, the plans have been laid and the signal is awaited" and endorsing
a gloss or clear and present danger test that discounts the probability of harm actually occurring
when the gravity of the potential harm is particularly great).
13 122 S. Ct. 1389 (2002).
54 See id. at 1402 (noting that "[i]n contrast to the speech in Ferber,speech that itself is the
record of sexual abuse, the CPPA prohibits speech that records no crime and creates no victims
by its production" and suggesting that social harm associated with virtual-child pornography,
unlike child pornography featuring real children "does not necessarily follow from the speech,
but depends upon some unquantified potential for subsequent criminal acts").
" See id. at 1407-11 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice
O'Connor argued that the prohibition on the use of youthful-appearing adults was overbroad,
but would have sustained the ban against the creation of virtual child pornography. See id. at
1410 ("Although in my view the CPPA's ban on youthful-adult pornography appears to violate
the First Amendment, the ban on virtual-child pornography does not.").
56 See id. at 1408-09 (noting that "the Government has a compelling interest in protecting
our Nation's children" and finding interest present in context of realistic virtual-child
pornography because "[s]uch images whet the appetites of child molesters .. who may use the
images to seduce young children").
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associated with a market for such materials could present a serious risk of
indirectly producing such harm. The existence of virtual child pornography
would also seriously complicate the government's ability to prosecute child
pornography cases, as defendants invariably would claim that the materials at
issue featured "virtual" rather than real children.57
One should keep in mind, of course, that the materials protected in Free
Speech Coalition are still subject to obscenity analysis under Miller v.
California.5 s That is to say, if the materials, viewed as whole, lack serious
literary, artistic, political, or scientific value, appeal to the prurient interest, and
describe or depict sex or excretory functions in a patently offensive way, the
government may prohibit them and punish their manufacture, sale, and
distribution. One should not, therefore, read Free Speech Coalition as a
generic greenlight to the production and sale of virtual or faux child
pornography. Rather, the decision forces the federal and state governments to
prosecute cases involving such materials under the somewhat less forgiving
standards of Miller (rather than Ferber).
In my own view, the Supreme Court rightly decided Free Speech Coalition.
The contrary view would sweep up a great deal of serious art and literature.59 If
the Free Speech Clause protects art and literature, this result cannot be
correct,60 especially when Ferber'scentral rationale-avoiding direct harm to
children in the production of erotica-is utterly absent. Moreover, Miller
ensures that materials lacking any serious nexus with important free speech
values will remain subject to plenary government regulation.

57 See id. at 1409 (noting possibility that "defendants indicted for the production,

distribution, or possession of actual-child pornography may evade liability by claiming that the
images attributed to them are in fact computer-generated" and concluding that "given the rapid
pace of advances in computer-graphics technology, the Government's concern is reasonable").
58 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973).
59 See Ashcroft, 122 S. Ct. at 1400-01 (noting that "teenage sexual activity and the sexual
abuse of children ... have inspired countless literary works," that "[c]ontemporary movies
pursue similar themes," and concluding that "[w]hether or not the films we mention violate the
CPPA, they explore themes within the wide sweep of the statute's prohibitions .... [t]his is
inconsistent with an essential First Amendment rule: The artistic merit of a work does not
depend on the presence of a single explicit scene").
60 See Alexander Meiklejohn, The FirstAmendment Is Absolute, 1961 Sup. CT. REV. 245,
256-57. Cf. Robert Bork, Neutral Principlesand Some FirstAmendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J.
1 (1971) (arguing that only political speech should be within the protection of the Free Speech
Clause).
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Although Free Speech Coalition generated a great deal of publicity, the
decision does not really engage the most difficult issues regarding child
pornography and the Internet. For the reasons noted in the previous section, it
is very easy to disseminate child pornography over the Internet and not
particularly easy to detect. Federal and state law enforcement agencies work to
discover and punish the distribution of such materials, but this is a losing battle.
Virtually anyone with an ISP subscription and a scanner can transmit child
pornography over the Internet.
Even when law enforcement authorities are able to identify the sources of
child pornography, their ability to do much about its distribution may be limited
if the server featuring the materials is physically located outside the United
States. A website with a server located in Thailand or France is effectively
beyond the immediate reach of United States law enforcement authorities.
Moreover, with the ease of producing child pornography in some foreign
nations and the ease of distribution provided by the Internet, a domestic market
for child pornography is an ugly side effect of the information superhighway.6'
Resolving the problem takes us back to the structural difficulties associated
with protecting children from age-inappropriate content. It is possible for a
government to block access to websites and limit the universe of materials
available on the Web. China engages in such efforts with a relatively high
measure of success. 62 It is therefore likely that the government could require
63
domestic ISPs to block access to websites featuring illegal child pornography.
This represents only a partial solution, however, because offshore sites
featuring child pornography can escape the block by simply opening another,
as-yet-unblocked, website. More draconian measures, such as blocking access
to all sites in a given country, would be grossly overbroad and prevent access to
materials that are constitutionally protected. So long as the Internet remains
both free and global in scope, it will be practically impossible to prevent its use

The problem of illegal Internet transactions is hardly limited to child pornography, of
course-online gambling services, with offshore net servers, are also effectively beyond
domestic law enforcement's powers.
62 See Shamoil Shipchandler, Note, The Wild Wild Web: Non-Regulation as the Answer to
61

the Regulatory Question, 33 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 435,447-48, 453-58 (2000); see also Richard
Cullen & Pinky D. Choy, The Internet in China, 13 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 99 (1999); Steven M.
Hanley, Comment, International Internet Regulation: A Multinational Approach, 16 J.
MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 997, 1005-06 (1998).
63 See, e.g., McGuire, supra note 20, at 768-70 (describing CompuServe's decision to shut
down chat rooms world-wide in order to avoid criminal prosecution in Germany for distributing
pornography and extremist political propaganda over its chat rooms).
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to disseminate child pornography without also blocking vast amounts of content
having nothing to do with kiddie porn. Simply put, it is much easier to monitor
the wares in an adult bookstore in Manhattan than it is to monitor the Web.
Thus, control devices that are effective in the context of a real world store with
a physical location within a domestic jurisdiction are, at best, ill-suited to the
Web.
Notwithstanding the furor over Free Speech Coalition,the case really does
not meaningfully address the most problematic aspects of attempting to excise
child pornography from the community. The case only establishes the
definition of child pornography, limiting it to materials featuring real children.
The fact is that a great deal of material coming within the Free Speech
Coalition majority's definition of proscribable child pornography circulates
freely on the Internet, with law enforcement forced to play an unwinnable game
of hide-and-seek with the purveyors of this sludge. Absent some sort of
technological breakthrough that facilitates much more nuanced blocking than
presently exists-and blocking that is somehow pro-active in nature to avoid
the expedient of simply relocating the content to another website-one of the
social costs of the Internet will be the enhanced availability of child
pornography.
CONCLUSION

Childproofing the Internet simply is not possible, unless the Supreme Court
is prepared to severely restrict the content available to adults in order to protect
children. Reno v. ACLU suggests that, at least for the moment, a majority of
the Justices are disinclined to take this step. Accordingly, children probably
will be able to access age-inappropriate materials on the Web. The primary
responsibility for protecting children from such materials will rest with parents
and caregivers, rather than the government. Safeguarding the First Amendment
rights of adults will mean that the age of innocence may be even further
reduced over time in our culture.
Turning to government efforts to eradicate child pornography, the Internet
has made law enforcement's work a great deal more difficult. Moreover, unlike
the question of preserving adult access to materials not appropriate for children,
there is simply no corresponding free speech benefit in encouraging and
facilitating a market in child pornography. But the same conditions that make it
very difficult to protect children from inappropriate content also work to
frustrate efforts to suppress child pornography.
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To be sure, there are ways of eradicating child pornography from the
Internet - government control over websites and government blocking of
64
unlicensed websites would effectively end the Internet trade in kiddie porn.
But, an effective solution to the problem would impose tremendous costs on
free speech on the Web. It is doubtful that the present Supreme Court would
sustain such regulations, even if Congress were to enact them (which also
seems unlikely). Consequently, the evil of child pornography will be a social
cost imposed on our society in exchange for the wonders of instant information
from virtually any location in the country with a telephone.

64 Cf Grosjean v. Am. Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936) (suggesting that any requirement that
works as form of press licensure, including differential forms of taxation, would violate the Free
Press Clause of the First Amendment).

